This paper considers ways of modelling time dependent inspection problems where there is a possibility of false alarms. For this purpose, it is assumed that safeguards procedures are notified to the inspectee by the inspector and are prima facie plausible ones. This 'inspector-leadership principle' implies that under reasonable assumptions the inspectee's strategy is legal in the sense of complying with agreed rules. The main objective of our investigation is to derive simple criteria for the determination of optimal inspection procedures from t.he .~quilibrium condit.ions for non-cooperat.ive non-zero sum t.wo-person games. It can be shown that, given the appropriate assumptions, one can arrive at 'statistical' optimization criteria. In the simplest case one gets the global probabilities of t.he errors of t.he first and second kind and in more complex cases the average run lengths for legal and illegal inspectee behavior.
Introduction
W'ith a few exceptions until now only time independent inspection problems were treated with the help of game theoretical models, or time dependent problems were transformed into time independent ones by use of appropriate assumptions. In addition, the few exceptions [4] , [5] , [7] , [8] represented inspection problems where false alarms were not possible.
In this paper the question for suitable ways of modelling time dependent inspection problems is posed, and it is assumed that false alarms cannot be avoided. Furthermore, the 'inspector-leadership principle' is Hsed, i.e., it is assumed that the inspector notifies his inspection procedure to the inspectee in a plausible way. In fact, this principle is used in various international safeguards systems; it guarantees under some additional assumptions at least in the time independent case that in equilibrium the inspectee behaves legally in the sense of complying with agreed rules.
The main objective of our investigation is to derive simple criteria for the determination of optimal inspection procedures from the equilibrium conditions for non-cooperative non-zero sum two-person games. For this purpose, we consider a class of inspection games where both players -inspector and inspectee -can act independently at a given number of discrete time steps. The set of pure strategies of the inspector is the set of statistical decision procedures based on observations of random variables at tlw various time steps. That of the inspectee consists of the choices between legal and illegal behavior, and an appropriate illegal strategy in the latter case. The game ends at any stage where the inspector decides that the inspectee behaved illegally, otherwise it continues until the last step where the inspector decides definitely whether or not the inspectee behaved legally. the first and second kind (false alarm and no detection of illegal action) as criteria for the determination of the equilibrium test procedure of the inspector. If one considers, however, an infinite sequence of discrete time steps and assumes that the payoffs to both players are discounted with time, then it can be shown that it suffices to use the average run lengths for legal and illegal inspectee behavior. This is a very satisfying result, since these criteria in fact are used for solving practical statistical problems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a general model of a sequential inspection game. Section 3 introduces the inspector-leadership principle and presents a general condition of a subgame perfect equ;llibrium point of the sequential inspectorleadership game. Section 4 investigates under what assumptions the sequential inspectorleadership game is equivalently reduced to the non-sequential inspector-leadership ,game. Section 5 analyzes the sequential inspector-leadership game in the infinite time horizon case. It is shown under some appropriate assumptions that we can use average run lengths for legal and illegal inspectee behavior as the criteria for the optimal test procedure of the inspector.
2 A Sequential Inspection Game There are two pla.yers I (inspector) and 0 (inspectee). lvII, ... , Mn are the (pure) action sets of the inspectee 0 at stages 1, ... , 1!, respectively. The action set of the inspector I is the same at all stages and consists only of two elements, A (alarm) and A (no alarm).
We assume that the set of 'feasible' actions for the inspectee at every stage t = 2, ... ,17, may depend on his previous actions before stage t. In order to formulate such a general situation, we introduce a collection of mappings {A1d~1' where each M t , t = 1, ... , n, maps A sequential inspection game r t, whose extensive form is sketched in Figure 1 , is played as follows:
(1) At stage 1, the inspectee 0 chooses an action f-lt E A1t (not observable to the inspector I). An observation Xl is drawn by a chance move according to the probability density function ftCif-ld. The observation Xl becomes common knowledge to both players.
(2) The inspector chooses either A (no alarm), in which case the game continues to stage 2, or A (alarm), in which case the game terminates with payoffs (It (f-lt}i Ot(f-lt}). If the inspectee's actions are given at all his moves, the inspector is faced with an 'optimal stopping problem' in the sequential inspection game r I (see [3] ). The inspector has to decide when to rai3e an alarm, i.e., stop the game. However, unlike other wellstudied game versions of the stopping problem, the second player (the inspectee) has no means to stop the game.
3 The Inspector-Leadership Principle
In our sequential inspection game ri, we will make the following special assumptions which are called the Inspector-Leadership Principle.
(i) Before the start of the game (i.e., at the zero stage), the inspector f chooses and announces a test procedure which determines for which ranges of observations of (ii) Knowing the test procedure 0 = (01, ... ,0,.), the inspectee 0 decides whether he will behave illegally (HI) or legally (Ho). If he decides to behave illegally, he will choose
n, where
J-lt is the size of the illegal action at stage t = 1, ... , n. For convenience, we put J-l = (0, ... ,0) in the case of legal behavior. Thereafter, the game really starts and ends either after the i-th stage if there is an alarm, or finally and definitely after n stages. Neither player has any possibility to adjust his decision in the course of the game. to the inspector and the inspectee, respectively, in case of illegal behavior, or with the payoffs to the inspector and the inspectee, respectively, in case of legal behavior. If no alarm is raised at stage t, then the next stage t + 1 will be reached. At the latest, after n stages the game ends with a terminal decision of the inspector. \Vhen no alarm is raised at stage n, the inspector and the inspectee receive the payoffs respectively, in case of illegal behavior, i.e., Lt lit = 11, and the payoffs (0,0) in case of legal behavior.
Given an illegal vector
Given an illegal vector ,Lt = (Ill, ... , I1n) of the inspectee 0, the family of conditional probability densities {.ft( xd!' h Xl, ... , Pt-I, 1:1-1, /Lt)} ~=l generates a probability distribution F"(XI, ... , Xn) over the Cartesian product XI X ... xX n . We put FO = F" when P := (0, ... ,0).
For every t = 1, ... , n, define the sets With the inspector-leadership principle described by (i) and (ii), the sequential inspection game fl in the first section can be transformed into a simpler game whose extensive form is sketched in Figure 2 ; we call it the sequential inspector-leadership game, denoted by f 2. In what follows, we will analyze the sequential inspector-leadership game f 2 . A (pure) strategy for the inspector in f 2 is defined to be a test procedure 8 = (8 1 , ... , 8 n ). A (pure) strategy for the inspectee in f2 is defined to be "( = hI, " (2) where "{I assigns to every 8 either Ho or HI and "{2 to every 8 a diversion vector Copyright © by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Given a strategy pair (8,,) , the expected payoffs for the inspector and the inspectee, denoted by Eg 1 (8,,) and Eg 2 ( 8, ,), respectively, are defined in a usual manner. Also, the conditional expected payoff for the inspectee given that the inspector selects 8 and the inspectee selects H1 can be defined. It is denoted by Eg 2 h18, Hd.
The standard solution concept of a non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibrium point. However, in a game with sequential structures, it has been commonly discussed that every Nash equilibrium point is not reasonable as a non-cooperative solution of the game. Some Nash equilibrium points may be supported by players' incredible threats which are not consistent with their payoff maximizing behavior. In order to eliminate such a difficulty of the Nash equilibrium point, we will employ a stronger notion of a subgame perfect equilibrium point to analyze the sequential inspector-leadership game 1'2'
We can now define a subgame perfect equilibrium point of the sequential inspector leadership game 1'2' 
where at = ( 
We can prove the proposition by the 'backward induction' argument in the theory of extensive games. First, from Lemma 3.1, the conditional expected payoff Eg2hlb, HI) for the inspectee 0 when the inspector selects a test procedure b = (bI, ... , b n ) and he selects illegal behavior HI is given by 1 -a; ). In the following two sections, we consider two special forms of the payoff parameters where just this case becomes the important one.
An Analysis of the Sequential Inspector-Leadership Game-A Finite Time Horizon Case
In this section, we will consider under what conditions the sequential inspector-leadership game f2 given in the last section can be equivalently reduced to the non-sequential inspector-leadership game discussed by Avenhaus and Okada [2] .
Let us assume the very special situation that the payoffs for the inspector and the inspectee are independent of the stage number, and, furthermore, that they are independent of the diversion "ector /1 = (/11, ... , Iln) in case of illegal behavior: o The next lemma shows that under Assumption 4.1 the expected payoffs of the inspector and the inspectee can be simply represented in terms of global 'non-detection' probability and 'false alarm' probability. The proof of the lemma is left to readers.
Lemma 4.2
Under Assumption 4.1, the expected payoffs for the inspector and the inspectee in r 2 are given as follows: (8)) are the overall nondetection and false alarm probabilities. 0 By Lemma 4.2, we can reduce the sequential inspector-leadership game r 2 into the non-sequential inspector-leadership game r 3 the extensive form of which is given in Figure   3 . With the help of this reduction, we can investigate a subgame perfect equilibriu point of the sequential inspector-leadership game r 2. where j3 ( 8, fl) = n t j3t ( 8, PI, ... , {1 t), {t = (p 1, ... , P. n ).
A subgame perfect equilibrium point of the non-sequential inspector-leadership game r 3 is characterized in [2] . From this result we obtain the following: (1) The 'false alarm' probability
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and 13 (8) is I~iven by (4.4). .. , n) has no influence on players' payoffs when the game stops at stage t with an alarm by the inspector: The early detection does not make the inspector better off. Furthermore, the later the inspector makes a decision, the more information he can obtain. Intuitively, these observations suggest that in the sequential inspector-leadership game f2 the inspector need not raise an alarm until the last stage. 
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where F 1 ( '; D, p,) and F o ('; D) are the moment l~enerating functions of the stages (random variables) that an alarm is raised in the cases of illegal behavior and legal behavior, respectively. 
Proof
for small values of V2 where Fin) (0; D, p,) is the n-th order derivative at (
The first term of (5.3) is F 1 (0; D, p,) = 1; the second of (5.3), given explicitly by
is the average run length of the game in case of illegal behavior.
We denote this by L 1 (D, p,) . Similarly, we denote by Lo(D) the average run length of the game in case of legal behavior which is given by
In what follows we will employ the first-order approximations of the expected payoffs of the inspector and the inspectee.
Assumption 5.3
For a strategy pair (D, /), the expected payoffs to the inspector and the inspectee are
Furthermore, we will use the following assumptions on the average run lengths of the tests under consideration which are satisfied for commonly used sequential tests.
Assumption 5.4 Let ~ be the set of test procedures 8 = (8 1 ,8 2 . ... ) of the inspector. For a given value Lo ~ 1, we define the set .6. Lo = {8 E ~ILo(8) = Lo}. 
---- 
in this case the inspectee will always behave legally.
6 Conclusions Let us consider once more the result of the fourth section where we assumed that both players' payoffs are independent of the stage where the game terminates. Theorem 4.3 shows that it suffices to optimize the probability of no detection for a given value of the false alarm probability a which is determined with the help of Eq. (4.6). This is important for several reasons: First, it is in line with standard statistical practice to proceed this way, and it ,permits the determination of optimal test procedures with the help of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, see, e.g., [6) .
One subtle point should be mentioned here: The application of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma requires et fixed alternative hypothesis which leads to the optimization problem Ob': '" instead of (4.5). If, however, there exists a sacldlepoint, then we can obtain an equilibrium point with the help of (6.1). This way, a series of practical problems have been solved, see, e.g., [1) .
Second, for CL given value of a, the payofl parameters need not be known for the determination of the optimal test procedure. In fact, in many practical cases it is impossible to estimate even ranges of these parameters. Only if one wants to determine the optimal value of a, then one needs to know the two ratios b/ f and d/ f of the inspectee's payoff parameters.
A similar picture is given by the result of the fifth section where the time aspect is important. Theorem 5.5 shows that. it suffice"; to optimize the average run length under the alternative hypothesis for a given value of the average run length under the null hypothesis which is determined with the help of eq. (5.7). This result justifies again standard statistical practice, see, e.g., [9] , even though there does not exist an equivalent of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma for sequential test procedures. These properties are typical for sequential tests, even though they cannot be shown as easily for tests other than those discussed here.
